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As part of its strategy to promote social mobil-
ity, the government is piloting a scheme of child 
development grants.1 Disadvantaged families 
will be offered up to £200 (€233; $335) as long 
as they attend and take up services offered by 
Children’s Centres, including parenting advice, 
liaison with job centres, and identification of 
children with special educational needs. The 
idea is modelled on the conditional cash trans-
fer schemes from Latin America that offer dis-
advantaged families money if mothers attend 
parenting seminars, infants attend health 
check-ups, and other stipulations are met such 
as compliance with immunisation and school 
enrolment. Although increasingly imitated, 
such schemes are controversial because they 
explicitly intertwine social mobility with behav-
iour change. Some unfavourable health, edu-
cation, and nutrition choices cluster with, and 
partly determine, socioeconomic disadvantage, 
and engagement with public services is thought 
to stimulate positive behaviour change. Con-
ditional cash transfer schemes further assume 
that targeted cash incentives will secure such 
engagement. The same reasoning underpins 
the UK government’s child development 
grants.
Here we consider UK experience in promot-
ing social mobility and behaviour change and 
review the international evidence on condi-
tional cash transfer schemes to throw light on 
how such schemes should be designed.
UK programmes 
Social mobility, or the degree to which p eople’s 
social status changes between generations, 
can be viewed as a measure of the equality of 
life opportunities and a reflection of parental 
influence, individual talents, motivation, and 
luck.w1 All sources agree on the crucial role of 
the home environment in early life, such as 
provision of consistent discipline. Develop-
mental measures are worse in poorer children 
as early as 22 months and continue to fall fur-
ther behind.w2 Tackling the problem was one 
of the Labour government’s central commit-
ments. Success, however, has been elusive: the 
most recent figures show a slight increase in the 
number of children living below the poverty 
linew3 as well as a decline in social mobility.w4
The two flagship social mobility initiatives 
were the New Deal for Communities and 
Sure Start local programmes. The New Deal 
for Communities was launched in 1998 and 
sought to transform deprived neighbourhoods, 
emphasising local variation as a key innova-
tion.  Residents were encouraged to identify 
local problems (such as fear of crime) and 
develop local solutions. Initial evaluation found 
negligible impacts on health, education, or sat-
isfaction with services, although area based 
outcomes, such as neighbourhood sentiment, 
fared better.w5 The evaluators concluded that 
community engagement was difficult, and there 
was little evidence that area based attempts 
improved the chance of success. 
Sure Start programmes, which began a year 
later, aimed to improve the health and devel-
opment of children under 4 years in socially 
deprived communities and also encouraged 
local variation. Early evaluations found worse 
social functioning and verbal ability among 
children of teenage mothers and single and 
unemployed parents in Sure Start areas com-
pared with similar children elsewhere.w6 Later 
evaluations, however, showed a more consist-
ent effect, with all families showing modest 
improvements in development, home environ-
ment, and likelihood of vaccination.w7
The government also invested heavily in 
understanding the drivers of individual and 
societal behaviour. A widely used framework 
is the 4E’s model (enable, engage, encourage, 
and exemplify).w8 The model uses an array of 
tools to change behaviour at individual, com-
munity, and societal levels (figure). Initiatives 
have nevertheless mostly focused on health, 
the environment, and adults not in education, 
employment, or training. Sure Start is the only 
initiative targeting parenting, although family 
nurse partnerships have recently started. This 
programme, developed over the past 30 years 
in the United States, aims to improve antena-
tal health and enhance child development by 
providing intensive, nurse led home visiting for 
vulnerable, first time parents. Nurses coach and 
support parents to adopt healthier lifestyles and 
develop parenting skills.w10
Initially, attention focused on financial and 
informational levers, but now, self belief and 
confidence to change are seen as critical.w9 
Family nurse partnerships exemplify this shift, 
providing highly personalised support struc-
tured within a broadly specified framework.w10 
Interest in conditionality—that is, benefits that 
are payable only if the recipient meets certain 
conditions or behaves in a certain way—has 
also been growing. Already well established 
in welfare to work entitlements, conditionality 
is increasingly being explored in areas such as 
weight management.w11 The evidence shows, 
however, that incentives or reward schemes 
are successful only if limited to simple, discrete 
behaviours, such as vaccination. Complex, 
sustained behaviours such as weight manage-
ment, and presumably parenting skills, are less 
responsive.w12 w13
There are three unanswered questions about 
the government’s child development grant 
scheme: can conditionality improve parenting 
in the early years? should the scheme be tar-
geted at individual households or areas? and, 
what is the scope for local variation across 
schemes? Below we examine the international 
evidence on conditional cash transfer schemes 
to look for answers.
Evidence on conditional cash transfer 
schemes 
Conditional cash transfer schemes are becom-
ing increasingly popular for several reasons. 
Firstly, they overcome some of the barriers to 
use of services (such as travel costs or incom-
plete information).2 Secondly, the schemes tar-
get early childhood. Conditional cash transfer 
schemes encourage investment in children’s 
long term welfare, at the same time as supple-
menting families’ immediate income or serving 
as a safety net. Thirdly, a partnership between 
government and families is created, which is 
a critical element in securing health equity.3 
Finally, conditional cash transfer schemes treat 
poverty as a multidimensional problem, requir-
ing joint input from health, education, and 
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w elfare services. Experience with co nditional 
cash transfer schemes has been generally posi-
tive. A systematic review in low and middle 
incomes countries showed that compliance 
with conditions was strong and translated in 
many cases to reduced rates of anaemia and 
stunting and improved self rated health.4
Objections, however, exist. These centre on 
the principle of benefits being tied to condi-
tions, concerns about sustainability, and the 
generalisability of findings in low and mid-
dle income countries to high income settings. 
Opponents point out that poor people do not 
lack will or ambition to improve their families’ 
lives but the opportunities to do so. They claim 
that conditional support is deplorable if it is 
essential to a family’s livelihood and that condi-
tions are drawn up by well paid professionals 
with little understanding of the reality of pov-
erty.5 The quality of services that programme 
participants are required to use is critical: 
enforcing the use of low quality services may 
worsen outcomes. 
Conditional cash transfer schemes were also 
developed in a particular context: a dominant 
view in Latin America is that poverty is a result 
of individual failure rather than lack of oppor-
tunity, which perhaps makes conditionality 
more socially acceptable.6
Can conditionality contribute to improved 
parenting?
Cluster randomised trial data from Mexico7 
and Nicaragua8 and prospective matched 
cohort data from Colombia9 and Jamaica10 
show significant increases in children’s visits 
to health centres, associated with better vac-
cination rates and receipt of health advice. 
The study did not collect data on more com-
plex aspects of parenting, except for analys-
ing household spending, which shifted toward 
fruits, vegetables, animal products, and chil-
dren’s clothing.9 Focus groups reported that 
schemes were well liked and that conditions 
were not viewed negatively.11
Two caveats apply when translating this evi-
dence. Firstly, conditionality necessitates high 
quality services. In Peru, services struggled to 
cope with increased demand and quality of 
care deteriorated.12 This is relevant domesti-
cally given the wide variation observed in the 
implementation of Sure Start objectives.w14 
Secondly, the UK child development grant is 
much smaller than the incentives used in Latin 
America. In Mexico and Colombia, cash trans-
fers equate to about 20% of monthly house-
hold income and are maintained throughout 
a child’s school years. In the UK, the average 
monthly income of the lowest quintile house-
holds is around £1200 a month.w15 A single 
payment of £200 is likely to be a weaker 
incentive. This is critical given the complex-
ity of parenting and any associated behaviour 
change. Notably, the only other conditional 
cash transfer scheme in a high income coun-
try, Opportunity NYC (http://opportunity-
nyc.org), offers disadvantaged families in the 
Bronx, Harlem, and Brooklyn an average of 
$250 a month for complying with conditions. 
Evaluation of the scheme is awaited.
Should the scheme be targeted at individual 
households or areas?
Most conditional cash transfer schemes use 
sophisticated mechanisms to identify indi-
vidual target households. They are generally 
successful, with an estimated 60% of benefits 
going to the poorest 20% of the population in 
Mexico, Brazil, and Chile.13 In Mexico, how-
ever, community relations suffered because 
household selection did not match local per-
ceptions of need and some households felt 
unfairly excluded.14 Furthermore, post-hoc 
evaluations estimated that household rather 
than geographical targeting was only just 
cost effective and, after accounting for social 
t ensions produced, may not have been worth 
it.15 Very few user views about conditional cash 
transfer scheme have been published, although 
those that have do not mention stigma.14
Targeting households has had negative con-
sequences in some schemes. A 2-4% increase 
in birth rate occurred in Honduras,16 and in 
Brazil, a 31 g reduction in children’s weight 
gain per month was seen, presumably because 
mothers viewed cash transfers as conditional 
on their children remaining underweight.17 
Such perverse effects highlight the importance 
of good design and clear communication.
Although the proposed UK child 
de velopment grant is small, it is just as 
imp ortant to ensure that benefits do not go 
to better off p eople. A complementary risk is 
that in equalities will worsen if families who do 
not respond to the incentive are left behind 
as others accrue new skills and capabilities. 
This is critical because upward social mobility 
has been shown to be associated with widen-
ing area based health inequalities in the UK.18 
The issue is complicated by the large socio-
economic heterogeneity we often see within 
small geographic areas. The solution may be 
to target areas and then use additional routine 
data to identify households needing support, 
as adopted by family nurse partnerships. Out-
reach to include particular households may also 
be needed, although it must be done carefully 
to avoid a sense of intrusion, and it is crucial 
that the government make clear how families 
that do not participate in Children’s Centre 
activities will be identified and provided for.
What is the scope for local variation?
Local variation is not a feature of Latin 
American conditional cash transfer schemes. 
Participants have complained they want 
more involvement in how schemes are run,19 
although the lack of variation may, of course, 
be central to the schemes’ success.
Two exceptions stand out. In Chile’s Puente 
scheme, counsellors support families to draw 
up their own conditions, such as supporting 
rehabilitation of family members in prison. 
Non-experimental survey data showed high 
compliance (up to 96.9%) and positive effects 
on social exclusion: 42.9% of beneficiaries 
reported that their principal gain was improved 
relationships within the family and commu-
nity.20 El Salvador’s Red Solidaria also has a 
mechanism for communities to identify devel-
opment needs. In addition, local lay women are 
elected to act as a link between the organisation 
running the conditional cash transfer scheme 
and beneficiary families. These women some-
times modify conditions for specific families. 
Women in this position report several benefits, 
including greater self esteem.21
Catalyse
Is the package enough
to break a habit and
kick start change?
Approach evolves
as attitudes and
behaviours change
over time
Enable
• Remove barriers
• Give information
• Provide facilities
• Provide viable alternatives
• Educate/train/provide skills
• Provide capacity
Exemplify
• Leading by example
• Achieving consistency in
   policies
Encourage
• Tax system
• Expenditure - grants
• Reward schemes
• Recognition/social pressure
   - league tables
• Penalties, fines and
   enforcement action
Engage
• Community action
• Co-production
• Deliberative forums
• Personal contacts/
   enthusiasts
• Media campaigners/opinion
   formers
• Use networks
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Although UK experience of community 
involvement in social mobility schemes has 
been disappointing, the success and popularity 
of Puente suggest that we should not abandon 
giving users say in the public services offered 
locally. Recent guidance from the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence on 
public health also encourages greater commu-
nity involvement.w16 The Young Foundation is 
experimenting with personalised incentives to 
encourage change to healthier behaviour in the 
Birmingham population and may provide fur-
ther evidence on the question of tailoring.w17 
Conclusions
The evidence that child development grants 
will contribute to social mobility is currently 
limited. Conditional cash transfer schemes, 
from which the idea derives, offer little gener-
alisable evidence, though they do offer some 
insights that may be relevant to designing a UK 
scheme. They suggest that the services offered 
have to be of high quality, that the incentives 
proposed may need to be increased to bring 
about more complex behaviour change, and 
that targeting at the area level is probably 
most efficient, although special efforts may be 
required to include the most disadvantaged 
households.  
Further research is needed on unresolved 
domestic policy questions such as appropriate 
targeting mechanisms and scope for allowing 
local variation. Given the health select com-
mittee’s recent damning criticism of the per-
sistent lack of evaluation of new initiatives to 
tackle inequalities,w18 child development grants 
must be accompanied by a strategy for robust 
ev aluation. 
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STATISTICAL qUESTIoN
Statistical significance and  
confidence intervals
c
1  Middle cerebral artery dot 
sign (fig 1).
2  Eye deviation towards 
the side of the infarction; 
contralateral hemianopia; 
contralateral sensory loss; 
global aphasia; apraxia; 
and visual, motor, and 
sensory neglect.
3  Post-thrombolysis 
multifocal intraparenchymal 
haematomas with a midline 
shift (fig 2).
4  Parenchymatous 
haemorrhage category 2 
(PH2)—blood in more than 
30% of the infarct area, with 
a substantial space effect.
CASE REPoRT
Transient loss of consciousness and a 
heart murmur
1  A transient loss of consciousness, chest pain on 
exertion, and a heart murmur are suspicious of a cardiac 
syncope.
2  The next diagnostic step should be transthoracic 
echocardiography.
3  Patients with a cardiac myxoma may be asymptomatic 
or they may present with one or more of the classic triad 
of cardiac, embolic, or systemic signs.
4  The treatment of choice is surgical excision. The survival 
rate is similar to that of the general population.
Fig 1 Non-contrast 
enhanced 
computed 
tomography scan of 
the patient’s head 
showing an area 
of hyperdensity in 
the distal middle 
cerebral artery 
seen in the sylvian 
fissure on the left 
(arrow)—the dot 
sign
Fig 2 Computed 
tomography scan 
of the patient’s 
head 24 hours after 
treatment showing 
two areas of 
haematoma within 
the left cerebral 
hemisphere 
(arrows)
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